We study when a monopolistically-competitive …rm may optimally choose to limit the size of its market. This may be the case when the cost of serving the market with geographically dispersed customers is increasing in size. We also investigate the incentives faced by a …rm to limit the reach of its market, when it adopts di¤erent pricing schemes. We show that under certain assumptions the derived equilibria are constrained socially optimal.
Introduction
In traditional models of spatial competition based on Hotelling (1929) a …rm has no advantage in limiting its spatial coverage. However, in many real-world situations, the choice of the market reach is voluntary. For example, a …rm chooses the size of its market area when it decides whether to open a new store, to enter a new market, to advertise its products, to develop a distributional channel, or to cream-skim consumers.
In this paper we use a modi…ed version of the standard framework proposed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) , where …rms and consumers face transport costs and …rms can choose reach, quality and price. In this setup, …rms operate in a monopolistically competitive market: product di¤erentiation ensures that a …rm retains some market power, but even with the cheapest delivered price, it is no longer the exclusive supplier. A stylized example of the model's characteristics we present pertains to the tourist industry. Imagine that the historical towns in Europe compete with each other in attracting visitors from around the world. Each town faces transport costs in the form of advertising aimed at informing the tourists about its attractions. If the campaign's e¤ectiveness decreases with distance, then a town may choose to limit its market coverage. This e¤ect is reinforced if also tourists' transport costs increase with distance, as one would normally expect.
The model is solved assuming two di¤erent pricing mechanisms. Under spatial price discrimination, a …rm may choose to limit its market coverage only when endogenous …xed costs are increasing in reach. Under uniform pricing, the coverage may be limited also when …xed costs are not a¤ected by reach, if unit variable costs are increasing in reach. The contrast arises because in the …rst case increases in production costs can be perfectly passed on to consumers, while in the second they cannot. In both settings, consumers' transport costs push towards a reduction of the market size and enhance the pro…tability of a strategy focussing on the more captive consumers. Finally, we show that the …rm's behaviour determines a constrained socially optimum equilibrium, i.e, it corresponds to the outcome that an industry regulator would impose.
As a real-world case of competition involving …rms that limit their reach, consider the Italian furniture districts of Prato, Biella, Brianza, Como and Pesaro. They consist of a few leading …rms (e.g., Cassina, Molteni, B&B, Scavolini, etc.) and a myriad of independent …rms which export their Italian-styled furniture around the world. A survey of 187 small exporters reveals that 161 of these sell to EU countries, 109 to East Europe, 97 to Americas, 66 to China and 80 to the rest of the world (Bramanti, 2007) . Among these, only 3 …rms play globally, but 102 operate at least in three macro-areas. Excluding the EU market, 163 …rms export to other macro-areas; the number of competitors which a …rm faces at least in one market remains rather high (on average 125 competitors). This example illustrates a couple of stylized facts that are included in our analysis. First, most of the …rms do limit their reach. Second, …rms do not exactly compete for the same markets, but their market areas do partially overlap. 1 A great deal of economic analysis has focussed on the impact of reach on costs. The international trade literature shows that …rms encounter important costs from being international. In fact, Rabino (1980) and Kedia and Chhokar (1986) found that logistic and transport costs, the complexity of paperwork, the problems from understanding and managing export procedures and foreign business practices, the need to modify products to meet foreign safety and health standards, engender important costs, especially to small manufacturing companies. These …ndings are con…rmed in more recent studies (McAuley, 1993 , and Katsikeas and Morgan, 1994 , 1998 . McCallum (1995) , in analyzing the trade among regions on the U.S.-Canada border, showed that the impact of borders on trade is quite large, even if the two countries are similar in terms of culture, language, and institutions. Other studies on border e¤ects provide many interpretations. For example, Rauch (1996) suggested that there are 'search' barriers, especially for di¤erentiated products. Anderson and van Wincoop (2001) stated that border barriers generate trade costs, which "involve real resources, such as gathering information about foreign regulations, hiring lawyers familiar with foreign laws, learning foreign languages and adjusting product designs to make them consistent with foreign customs and regulations." Bandyopadhyay (1999) analyzed distribution sectors in OECD countries and showed that high distribution costs can be a barrier to trade and limit the extent of spatial coverage. In informative advertising models, Grossman and Shapiro (1984) considered the case where oligopolistic …rms and monopolistically-competitive …rms are able to choose the amount of purely informative advertising (i.e., the fraction of consumers they want to inform) and assume that the costs of advertising technology are increasing in reach. Under these assumptions, they show that it may be optimal to limit the coverage. In regulation literature, public utilities encounter di¤erent costs for serving di¤erent types of customers (for example, urban and rural customers) and, if allowed, …rms choose to cream-skim costumers (La¤ont and Tirole, 1990 ). This paper is related to the stream of new economic geography literature (for a survey, see, 1 A spatio-temporal interpretation of the same stylised facts is provided by the taxi market in a town. Consumers value variety, i.e. the opportunity of hiring a taxi whenever they need and wherever they are. Taxis usually choose to limit their market size (for example, they do not serve potential customers who cannot be reached within 5 minutes). As consumers and taxis move around the town, competition on a single consumer concerns only few taxis even if in general all taxis compete with each other. for example: Ottaviano and Puga, 1998 ) and, in particular, with the core-periphery model (Krugman, 1980 and Helpman and Krugman, 1985, Ch. 10) , where …rms'and consumers' transport costs play a crucial role. However, our contribution is di¤erent in several ways. First, we do not set the model in a two-country framework, but, rather, in a continuous framework. Thus, transport costs vary with the relative location of consumers and …rms. Second, in the core-periphery models, it is optimal for …rms to serve the entire market. Transport costs only distort the consumption in favor of home production, while in our model with increasing costs of reach, …rms can optimally choose to serve only a portion of the market.
In models of spatial competition, …rms usually serve customers exclusively (Kohlberg, 1983; Parr, 1995; Piga and Poyago-Theotoky, 2005; Wong and Yang, 1999) . We depart from this assumption by letting the same place be part of the catchment area of di¤erent …rms (Anderson and de Palma, 2000; Drezner and Drezner, 1996) The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 introduces the model: Sections 2.1 and 2.2 show its short-and long-term solution under the assumptions of spatial price discrimination and uniform pricing, respectively. Section 3 derives the condition for which the previous equilibria are a constrained optimum from a social point of view. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
The Model
Market area. Let M be the number of …rms and s i 2 S i [0; 1] denotes the size of the market area, or reach, that …rm i 2 M wants to serve. Each …rm can decide to sell its product on the entire market (i.e., s i = 1) or to focus on a portion of the market (i.e., s i < 1). Consumers have unitary mass and each is indexed by ! 2 [0; 1]. However, consumers are heterogeneous for each …rm, in the sense that each …rm i ranks each consumer di¤erently. That is, each consumer's position is de…ned in accordance to a …rm-speci…c permutation function that randomly determines …rm i's rank of consumer !. I.e., T i :
. This implies that for anys i s i , consumer ! = T 1 i (s i ) belongs to …rm i's market area S i := [0; s i ]. Furthermore, for each pair of …rm i and k, the distributions of consumers generated by T i and T k are perfectly independent, implying that consumers are randomly positioned across the …rms' market areas. However, all the …rms compete with each other even when they do not serve the entire market. 2 The following example clari…es this set-up. The position in S i denotes a decreasing position in the ranking of …rm i's preferences. Moreover, note that despite the limited market areas, all …rms compete among each other.
Consumer demand. Let q i 2 [0; 1] be the quality o¤ered by …rm i and p i > 0 be the monetary price paid by the consumer. Each consumer ! has preferences for all brands described by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function:
where I fT i (!)2S i g is the indicator function, which assumes 1 when T i (!) 2 S i and 0 otherwise, 2 (0; 1) is such that = 1= (1 ) is the elasticity of substitution between any two products, N is the number of varieties that consumer ! can buy, j 2 N refers to a …rm whose market area includes consumer !, and x j and q j are, respectively, the quantity and the quality provided by …rm j to consumer !. Consumers'transport costs will be assumed to be of the 'iceberg' type; that is, only a fraction t j 1 of the goods shipped by …rm j arrives to consumer !. Note that t j depends on the position of consumer ! in …rm j's market area. That is t j = t (T j (!)) = t (s) with t 0 0, i.e., the more the customer is preferred by the …rm, the lower the transport costs. 3 Note that we can interpret the market size area s i as the probability for consumer ! of belonging to the market area of …rm i, hence N = P M i=1 s i . (For simplicity, the integer number problem is omitted). The consumer budget constraint is: P N j=1 p j x j = I, where I is the expenditure for the goods. The demanded quantity (gross of shipping costs) by consumer ! from …rm j, namely x j , is:
and that this subset is generally di¤erent for di¤erent consumers. 3 For instance, on eBay many retailers di¤erentiate the delivery cost depending on the postal code of the buyers.
where X :=
and P := P N j=1 (p j =t j q j ) 1= are respectively the quantity index and the price index and := (1 ) = is inversely related to the elasticity of substitution. 4 Consumer's demand is the result of two factors:
, that captures the quantity demanded as a function of prices and quality but not of transport costs and j := t =(1 ) j 1 which represents the negative impact of transport costs on quantity demanded.
Variable costs. Unit variable costs are c (s i ; q i ) = q i g (s i ), g > 0, g 0 , g 00 0. They include the cost of producing, customizing, and delivering one unit of good of quality q i to a generic consumers i 2 S i . The elasticity of variable costs with respect to quality is given by 2 [0; 1). Because @ 2 c=@q 2 i < 0, then the unit variable costs increase proportionally less than the quality perceived by consumers. This modelling choice is similar to that of Shaked and Sutton (1987) , where "the costs of quality improvement involve at most only a modest rate of increase in unit variable cost. (p. 136)". Summing up, total variable costs are:
Fixed costs. Fixed costs, denoted by h (s i ; q i ) are unrelated to the production level, but depend on the choice of reach and quality. They account for costs accruing from acquiring information on foreign markets, understanding export procedures and foreign business practices, advertising, post-sale and return policy, R&D expenditures as well as costs involving product design to meet foreign safety and health standards. Let h > 0 and h s ; h q ; h ss ; h0.
Economies of size. Denote h (s i ; q i ) = h (s i ; q i ) =s i as the …xed costs divided by the size of the market area, or, simply, average …xed costs.
De…nition 1
The function h (s i ; q i ) exhibits (dis)economies of size when, by expanding the reach s i , the average …xed costs decrease (increase), i.e.
Note that equation (4) is analogous to the de…nition of economies of scale in standard microeconomic analysis. Let s m be the market size that minimizes the average …xed cost for a given quality q, that is, s m = arg min s h (s; q). Insert Figure 1 about here In the two following sections, we solve the model under two di¤erent pricing schemes: spatial price discrimination and uniform pricing. In either cases the market equilibrium in a monopolistic competitive structure is derived using the zero-pro…t entry condition.
Firm supply under spatial price discrimination
Recall how T i de…nes …rm i's ranking of consumers in its market area. Spatial price discrimination entails that the …rm can charge each consumer di¤erently depending on the latter's position in the ranking.
The pro…t of …rm i is given by the following expression:
Firm i maximizes (5) by simultaneously choosing three strategic variables: price, quality and size of the market area. First order conditions imply that:
Each of these conditions implies that at the margin, the bene…t from increasing each decision variable equals its cost. More importantly, to be consistent with the assumptions of monopolistic competition, we have to check that the impact of a change of price, quality and size of the market area on the demand is negligible (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) . Hence we look at the impact of a change in the choice variables on the price index P . The independence of market areas allows us to evaluate the elasticity @ log P=@ log p i and @ log P=@ log q i that are of the order 1=M , and the elasticity of @ log P=@ log s i that is of the order =M . Hence, assuming M is reasonably large we can neglect the e¤ect of p i , q i and s i on P . Substituting (6) into (7) and (8), and using (3) in (8), we obtain:
From (9), …rm i's per-unit variable pro…t (p i (s i ; q i ) c (s i ; q i )) is equal to c (s i ; q i ) and, by the same token, its total variable pro…t is C (s i ; q i ). Similarly, using (10),
where R i indicates …rm i's total revenues. Therefore, in both equations the left-hand side represents the percentage markup over variable costs, i.e., the marginal bene…t from a change in s i and q i , while the right-hand side denotes the respective marginal costs. Equations (9) and (10) suggest that the solution is interior only if h s i (s i ; q i ) > 0 and
Proposition 1 Under spatial price discrimination, when h s i (s i ; q i ) = 0, a …rm serves the entire market; when h s i (s i ; q i ) > 0, it can be pro…table for the …rm to limit the size of the market area. When the solution is internal, a …rm's optimal choice is described by equations (6), (9) and (10) .
Market equilibrium. Monopolistic competition implies that …rms enter the market until pro…ts go to zero. Zero-pro…t condition assures that variable pro…ts equal …xed costs. Hence:
We look for an internal, unique and symmetric solution where x i = x , p i = p , s i = s and q i = q .
Lemma 1 For each optimizing …rm, C (s ; q ) is weakly concave in s , that is, C (s ; q ) =s @C (s ; q ) =@s.
Combining (9), (10) and (12), we obtain:
where s + := s (C=s ) = (@C=@s) s according to Lemma 1 and q + = q = (1 ) T q if T (1 ).
Proposition 2 Let s and q be internal, symmetric and unique solution, then the equilibrium condition is provided by equation (13) . In equilibrium, s s m := arg min s h (s; q). Figure 1 shows that the …rms optimally choose to operate below the average cost minimizing size. Although this is a reminescent of the excess capacity equilibrium outcome in monopolistically competitive markets, Proposition 2 emphasizes the importance of transport costs in our setting, as the following corollary shows.
Corollary 1 When g 0 = 0 and t 0 = 0, then the size of the market area, s coincides with the average …xed cost minimizing size, s m .
Thus, transport costs play a crucial role in limiting the market size. Furthermore, increasing the market size entails serving more distant consumers, thereby increasing the …rms' average unit costs: hence the result in Proposition 2. 6 We now turn to the analysis of the optimal quality level.
Proposition 3 Let s and q be internal, symmetric and unique solution, then the equilibrium condition is provided by equation (13) . In equilibrium,m := arg min q h (s; q) =q when 1 andm when 1 .
The choice of quality is driven by the interplay between its impact on costs and consumers' preferences indicated by . Recalling both (11) and that denotes the percentage markup on unit costs of production, the interpretation of Proposition 3 hinges around the trade-o¤ between quality and quantity. When > 1 (i.e. when it is more pro…table to enlarge production), each …rm choose a level of quality below the cost minimizing level q m while the opposite holds when < 1 . Proposition 3 is illustrated in Figure 2 .
Insert Figure 2 about here When is large, products are highly di¤erentiated, i.e. consumers strongly appreciated varieties, …rms enjoy greater markup on unit costs and choose to produce a lower quality. When products are highly substitutable, …rms relax price competition by enhancing their product quality.
To identify the equilibrium number of …rms and varieties in the long run, using the expression for the budget constraint, we can write:
Noting that the zero-pro…t condition (12) can be written as (1 ) R s 0 p (s) x (q; p (s)) (s) ds = h, and exploiting symmetry, we have:
As expected, the number of …rms is increasing in the consumer income I and is decreasing in the elasticity of substitution = 1= (1 ) and …xed costs h.
Firm supply under uniform price
In this section, …rms charge the same price to the consumers in their market areas. The pro…t function is the same of equation (5) but the …rst order condition for price now yields:
where c (s i ; q i ) = R s i 0 c (s; q i ) (s) ds= R s i 0 (s) ds is the average unit cost weighted by transport costs.
The remaining …rst order conditions are:
where (s i ) = 1
Consider the zero-pro…t condition:
Now, substituting equation (16) into (17), (18) and (19) , and after some simpli…cations, we obtain that:
In spatial price discrimination, h s i (s i ; q i ) > 0 is a necessary condition for …rms to limit their reach. This is no longer necessary under uniform pricing. Assume that h s i (s i ; q i ) = 0. Thus, …rst order condition (20) is satis…ed when c (q i ; s i ) = c (s i ; q i ). Under uniform prices, …rms may decide to limit their coverage when their unit costs are increasing in the reach. Notice that if h s i (s i ; q i ) = 0, and unit variable costs c (s i ; q i ) are independent of s i , then the …rm chooses not limit its market coverage and (s i ) does not a¤ect such a decision.
Proposition 4 Under uniform prices, it can be pro…table for the …rm to limit the size of the market area when: h s i (s i ; q i ) > 0 or h s i (s i ; q i ) = 0 and unit variable costs, c (s i ; q i ), are increasing in the reach.
When the solution is internal, the …rm's optimal choice is described by (16) , (20) and (21) .
To obtain the market equilibrium outcome under symmetry p u , s u , q u , M u and N u , combine the …rst order and zero-pro…t conditions (16) , (20) , (21) and (19):
The quality condition is exactly the same as in the spatial price discrimination case. Furthermore, Corollary 1 still holds. In the more general case, the convexity of (s) and c (s; q) yields (s) = (s) > 1 and c (s; q) c (s; q) > 0. Both e¤ects lead to the equilibrium outcome that it is optimal to limit the size of the market area, in addition to the role played by economies of size in h. That is, relative to the spatial price discrimination case, transport costs and unit variable costs of production a¤ect the optimal market size when the …rms can only charge a uniform price. Moreover, the …rst e¤ect is relevant only if h s (s; q) > 0, while the second one plays a role even if h s (s; q) = 0. The contrasting outcome arising under the two di¤erent pricing schemes is due to the possibility that spatial price discrimination enables the …rms to pass the increases in production costs on to the consumers. The number of varieties and the number of …rms are expressed as in (15) 
Social Optimum, Market Area and Quality
To study the circumstances under which the previous analysis yields a social optimum, we follow Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) who consider ".. a rather surprising case where the monopolistic competition equilibrium is identical to the optimum constrained by the lack of lump sum subsidies (p. 301)". In the constrained socially optimum outcome they derive, the impossibility to use taxation and lump sum transfers to and from consumers and …rms, suggests that the social planner is an industry regulator whose power does not extend beyond the industry. However, such a regulator can decide upon the relevant market variables, thereby achieving a constrained social optimum.
In the present setting, in order to maximize utility (and therefore social welfare), the regulator chooses each …rm's price p r , reach s r , quality or standard q r , the number of …rms on the market M r , having the consumer budget and the zero-pro…t condition as constraints.
We solve the regulator's problem for the case in which c does not depend on s. Thus, spatial price discrimination and uniform pricing coincide due to the fact that consumers' transport costs are of the iceberg type (Fujita and Thisse, 2002, Ch. 9; Hsu, 1979) . We assume that P N j=1 j is constant among consumers, i.e. they have on average identical transport costs. Proof. The regulator chooses quantities to maximize q P N j=1 (t j x j ) 1= subject to P N j=1 x j = I=p, yielding x j = j = x g = g =: k. After replacing this in the utility function, it emerges that u = kq P N j=1 j
1=
. The total welfare function is obtained by integrating over consumers:
where the last equality holds because P N j=1 j is constant. Aggregating over consumers yields the budget constraint 
Noting that k = x j = j is constant for every j, replacing (25) into (24) yields:
Finally, taking the …rst order conditions with respect to M , S and q, we obtain equivalent solutions to (15) , (13) and (23):
, h (s r ; q r ) s r = @h (s r ; q r ) @s , h (s r ; q r ) q r = 1 @h (s r ; q r ) @q .
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have derived the conditions under which a …rm chooses to limit its market size, for the case of two di¤erent pricing rules. Under spatial price discrimination, we …nd that a …rm limits the size of its market area only when …xed costs are increasing in the reach. Alternatively, in the case of uniform prices, it emerges that increasing variable costs may be su¢ cient to induce …rms to limit their reach, even if …xed costs are not a¤ected by the spatial coverage. Finally, we have shown that the monopolistic competitive equilibrium is constrained socially optimal; i.e., it yields a level of price, quality and market reach which is equivalent to the solution to the problem solved by an industry regulator.
With regards to the literature on international trade, our framework can provide an additional explanation to the overestimation of the trade ‡ows obtained by gravity models, as in McCallum (1995) . These models usually estimate a demand function where the quantity demanded is a decreasing function of transport costs. From the present theoretical perspective, a lack of trade is not only due to increasing variable transport costs induced by the presence of borders, but, also, to increasing …xed costs, which induce …rms to limit their market coverage and not to o¤er their products internationally.
More generally our …ndings could be usefully extended to formally introduce trade areas into international trade models. Our set-up hinges on the hypothesis that all …rms preferences are independent; however, it is possible to identify some main geographical, cultural and linguistic areas within which groups of …rms prefer to operate. When limiting the reach is a pro…table option, our …ndings imply that removing the trade area is unlikely to yield any bene…ts if the size of the area is larger than the optimal reach. Thus, our model suggests that policy intervention should focus on the causes that lead …rms to limit their reach, that is, on the factors a¤ecting the transport costs on both the …rms'and the consumers'sides. 
Second order conditions.
We present the second order su¢ cient conditions for a local maximum, under spatial price discrimination and under uniform pricing.
Spatial price discrimination. The Hessian of the spatial price discrimination problem has in…nite uncountable dimention as it includes the derivatives with respect to p (s),s 2 S = [0; s].
To compute the second order conditions, we divide the interval S into L sub-intervals indixed by l = 1::L, each of length s=L = ds. Let bes l := s (l 1=2) =L and p l := p (s l ). Notice that for L ! 1, the function P L l=1 I [(l 1) ds;l ds) p l converges to p (s). The Hessian evaluated at the stationary point is:
where = 1 d ds c t t c 0, A = (1 )+(1 ) 2 +( 3 2) (1 )(1 ) , = diag d 2 =dp 2 l = x(1+ ) c(sl;q ) ds; l = 1; ::; L is a diagonal matrix, which is de…nite negative and v = d 2 =dqdp l = x = ( q) ds; l = 1; ::; L T is a column-vector. Being satis…ed the second order su¢ cient conditions is required that the determinants of the principal minors present alternate signs. In this case, we have to analyse the following conditions:(a) H 11 < 0, (b) H 11 H 22 (H 12 ) 2 > 0, and (c) the elements on that diagonal matrix, d 2 =dp 2 l , be negative. In fact, we can disregard to check principal minors of order higher than 2, i.e. H 11 H 22 (H 12 ) 2 p 1 p l (ds) l + o ds l as they all present the exact sign when (b) and (c) simultaneously hold. 7
Condition (a) is satis…ed if h is su¢ ciently convex, i.e.: h=h q > A or when A > 0, i.e. 
To provide an economic interpretation, we assume a speci…c functional form for h, i.e.:
h = h 0 + e s q , h 0 > 0 and 1.
Replacing (A3) into (A2), we have: H 33 H 2 12 < 0. Conditions (a') is the same of (a). To provide an economic interpretation of (b') and (c'), we assume that h follows (A3). For condition (b'), this yields to the following inequality:
Notice that in order to be satis…ed, it is su¢ cient that: (A + 2 1) > 2 . In addition, notice that c p c 1 and c p c = 1 when dc ds = 0. When u = 0, (A6) simpli…es in:
Hence, when and are large and is small, the equation is certainly satis…ed. Using (A3), after some simpli…cations, condition (c') is satis…ed when ( (1 ) (1 )) u (p c) 2 + (1 ) p 2 c 2 > 0
